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From Community-Based to Co-Management: Improvement or Deterioration in 
Fisheries Governance in the Cherai Poyil Fishery in the Cochin Estuary, Kerala, 
India? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
During the last 50 years, several different forms of fisheries governance have been 
tried and failed in the Cochin Estuary, Kerala, India. The latest shift has been from a 
community-based system to a co-management system, and this paper evaluates the 
current system in the light of the theoretical debate over the respective merits of 
community management and co-management. The paper is based on documentary 
material and data from interviews carried out during fieldwork in 2004, from which it 
concludes that provided the co-management system incorporates community 
principles within it, it will be an effective form of fisheries governance. 
 
Keywords:  community-based fisheries management; co-management; Cherai Poyil 
fishery, Kerala  
 
1. Introduction 
 
According to Pomeroy and Viswanathan [1], in Southeast Asia there has been ‘a shift 
from community based fisheries management (CBFM) to co-management and finally 
to issues of decentralisation’. They state that community-based management of 
natural resources arose during the 1960s in irrigation programmes, and spread to 
fisheries during the 1980s [2][3][4][5]. The characteristic feature of CBFM was that it 
held the government at arm’s length: ‘[It] was people centred and community 
focussed and often had very little government involvement. CBFM practitioners often 
viewed government in an external role only to be brought into the activities at a later 
stage or as needed. This often led to misunderstandings and lack of full support from 
government for those initiatives [6]. By contrast, co-management, which emerged 
during the 1990s, focused ‘not only on people and the community but also on a 
partnership arrangement between government and the local community and resource 
users. CBFM was then considered an integral part of co-management’ [7]. In other 
words, co-management did not so much replace community-based management as 
absorb it, to form a composite system which Pomeroy and Viswanathan term 
‘community-based co-management’ (CBCM).  Moreover, CBCM had a wider remit 
than resource management, extending its reach to such goals as community 
development and social empowerment. According to Pomeroy and Viswanathan [8], a 
second change occurred simultaneously – decentralisation: ‘In early 1990s, at about 
the same time co-management was emerging, there was also a movement in Asia 
towards decentralisation…the systematic…dispersal of power, authority and 
responsibility from the central government to lower or local level institutions…even 
to community associations…in support of government policies…which stressed the 
need for greater resource user participation and the development of local 
organizations to handle some aspects of fisheries management’. This entailed state 
governments handing over fishing rights to local communities, as endorsed by 
fisheries officials of ASEAN countries at a meeting in Bangkok in 2001 [9]. 
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This paper uses the case study of the Cherai Poyil fishery in the Cochin estuary in 
Kerala, India to test the hypothesis of Pomeroy & Viswanathan and others (including 
Allison and Badjeck [10]) that there has been a shift from a community-based system 
to a broader community-based co-management system, reinforced by devolved 
powers from the central government, with a wider remit embracing socio-economic 
goals as well as natural resource management. The paper also seeks to evaluate the 
success or otherwise of the shift to co-management that has taken place in the 
management of the Cherai Poyil fishery.     
 
In section 2, the methodology of the research which produced this paper is explained; 
section 3 outlines the ecological and social context of the Cherai Poyil fishery in the 
Cochin estuary; in section 4, the three most recent stages of governance of the Cherai 
Poyil fishery are identified; section 5 focuses on the current system of fishery 
governance (co-management); in section 6, the strengths and the weaknesses of the 
current system are discussed; and the concluding section 7 summarises the findings of 
the paper.   
 
2. Methodology 
 
The paper is based on a study carried out in 2004 which examined the role of public 
and private interactions in the management of Cochin estuary [11][12]. An inter-
disciplinary study team of fisheries scientists and social scientists, research scholars 
and consultants were involved in identifying the major economic activities in the 
Cochin estuary; conducting detailed frame surveys on various traditional and modern 
stakeholders; and collecting primary data on the target population, the number of 
fishing and non- fishing households, the main occupational patterns, and the 
economic and social organisation of various fisheries (prawn filtration, agriculture 
and aquaculture). A variety of methods of obtaining data was used, including detailed 
interviews, livelihood surveys, rapid rural appraisals, and participatory research. 
During the frame survey, information on the number of fishers operating different 
kinds of gears in the Poyil was collected, and 59 fishers were interviewed, comprising 
seven stake netters, four Chinese netters, 10 cast  netters, 12 gill netters, two seine 
netters, eighteen clam fishers, and ten fisherwomen engaged in hand picking. Included 
in these interviews were surveys of livelihood and economic viability linked to the 
various gear groups, following the technique devised by Scoones [13]. The fishers 
interviewed were randomly selected at their respective fishing spots, and followed up 
subsequently during the period January-December 2004. Interviews were also 
conducted with ten community, Panchayath and trade union leaders who belonged to 
the two main political parties – eight from the Marxist Communist Party and two from 
the Congress Party – focusing particularly on institutional interplay, conflict 
resolution, gender balance and environmental management.  
 
Records kept in the local Panchayath and the state fisheries department were 
consulted to verify the authenticity of claims made during interviews, and to provide 
information on formal and informal institutions, including policy instructions and 
directives related to decentralisation, resource mobilization, delivery of services, 
extent of community participation in Poyil administration, institutional partnership 
arrangements, local community empowerment, the status of women, and the role of 
civil society in decentralized coastal area management.  
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3. Ecological and social context of the Cherai Poyil fishery in the Cochin estuary 
 
Cherai Poyil is a 210 hectare brackish water pond located at the extreme north-west 
opening of the Cochin estuary in Kerala, India (Figure 1). 
 
 [Insert Figure 1 here]  
 
The Poyil, which lies within the administrative boundaries of Pallippuram 
Panchayath, is 6.25 kilometres long, and the fishing territory has a length of 3.67 
kilometres and an average depth of 1.2 metres. Tidal functions of the estuary bring a 
variety of fish into the Poyil, and local communities around the Poyil depend on these 
fisheries for their livelihoods. The gear used by fishers include Chinese nets, stake 
nets, cast nets and gill nets, to catch over 70 species of fish and shellfish, most of 
which are available throughout the year. Apart from fishing, people undertake both 
aquaculture and agriculture in the wetlands. Traditionally, farmers cultivate paddy 
rice for the first six months of the year followed by prawn culture for the remaining 
six months. However, during the last three years, people have abandoned paddy rice 
cultivation due to its low yield and high labour cost, and converted these lands to 
culture prawns in aquaculture farms called Varshakkettu. The total area of the 
Varshakkettu is 65 hectares, containing 16 farms in which semi-intensive of prawn 
culture is practised. 
 
4. Three stages of governance of the Cherai Poyil fishery 
 
During the last 50 years, the Cherai Poyil fishery has been managed by a succession 
of three governing systems: state control; community-based management; and co-
governance. 
 
4.1 State control 
 
Before the 1950s, there were no formal rules governing the access and use of fisheries 
within the Cherai Poyil fishery. Fishing, agriculture and prawn filtrations were 
traditionally organized by local communities according to informally agreed 
normative and communitarian principles, which meant in practice that fishers were 
subordinated to the leading agrarian castes. In the 1950s, the state government 
nationalised the Cherai Poyil fishery as national state property: Poyil fisheries were 
brought under the direct control of the Cochin-Travancore states, and when the Kerala 
state was formed in 1956, the administration of Poyil fisheries was taken over by the 
Kerala State Fisheries Department. The state government took steps to improve the 
infrastructure of the estuary. For example, to enable agrarian communities to 
undertake various economic activities on the ecosystem, the channel extending from 
the Munampam bar mouth to Nayarambalam was developed by local landlords with 
state government assistance, employing large numbers of people from the local 
workforce. In addition, the state government constructed a number of canals for 
draining water from pokkali paddy fields, so that agriculture (pokkali paddy rice and 
coconut plantations) could provide basic livelihoods for local people, supplemented 
by fishing and prawn filtration. These interventions had a major impact in 
transforming the way people in the area earned their living.   
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The first formal law that regulated access to fishing in this water body came into 
effect with the national Travancore–Cochin Fisheries Act (1950), which stipulated for 
the first time that state governments could collect rents/fees from fishermen who 
fished in water bodies within their administrative boundaries. The Act further ruled 
that auctions would be held to distribute fishing rights to the highest bidders, and that 
both individual contractors/associations and fishing community associations or their 
cooperatives could participate in these auctions. The duration of fishing rights was 
limited to one year, and lessees would remit their rents directly to the state 
government fisheries department before commencing fishing: any fishing rent arrears 
were legally recoverable in the same way as arrears of land revenue. The lessees were 
legally bound to grant equitable access to different fishing gear groups in the 
community. 
 
4.2 Community-based management 
 
Despite the economic benefits which state government control had brought to the 
area, various grievances surfaced against its system of fisheries management. First, 
fishers thought the state government placed too many restrictions on the use of 
particular fishing gears, and local fishing communities resisted the restrictive 
allocations dictated by successful bidders (‘contractors’). Second, the system of public 
auctioning gave an opportunity to private contractors to bid for fishing rights at high 
rents, which ultimately displaced local communities from management, and made 
fishers once more subordinate to dominant castes, because the majority of the 
contractors belonged to the higher castes. Third, contractors unilaterally decided the 
revenues charged to different gear user groups to whom they sub-leased the fishing 
rights. In 1955, as a result of their resentment at this situation, representatives from 
three fishing communities (Vaalan, Kanakkan and Arayan) requested the state 
government to terminate the leasing system and hand over fishing rights in the area to 
local community fishers’ organizations.  Acceding to this request, the state 
government granted fishing rights to these three local communities for Rs 10,518.75 
for one year, which was only one-third of the amount previously auctioned.   
 
For local communities, management of the Poyil fisheries, especially the permitting 
of access to various gear groups, became their greatest challenge, and to meet it they 
introduced a number of proposals to control fisheries. These proposals, which were 
discussed by each of the community fishers’ societies, concerned modes/criteria for 
allocating fishing rights to individuals; the fees to be charged to each gear; the persons 
to whom fishers would sell their catches; and the mechanisms to resolve conflicts. 
The proposals were forwarded to the state government department of fisheries for 
approval, which it granted without requiring many changes. Informal rules enacted as 
local by-laws would supplement these formal rules, to be adhered to by gear groups 
and the contractors. To some extent, this system resembled co-management, in that it 
involved both the state government and the community in decision-making. But the 
centre of gravity lay firmly in the community: the state government’s role was 
confined to that of formal approval of the proposals made by the Poyil fishing 
communities. The presence of similar systems in other villages around the estuary has 
been reported by other scholars, including Lobe and Berkes [14] and Srinivasan [15]. 
 
However, community-based management was a short-lived system, because of a 
series of internal conflicts and related management incompetence due to the fact that 
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most of the community fishers’ organizations were new and did not possess adequate 
managerial and technical skills to manage resources and finances. Although these 
organizations received financial assistance from the state government to manage 
fisheries, they incurred huge financial liabilities, and after three years, the state 
government liquidated them.  
 
4.3 Co-management  
 
The management system that replaced this brief period of community-based 
management was co-management – i.e. a sharing of power between local government 
(Panchayath - the leading force in the partnership) and local communities. Because of 
the move towards decentralisation by the Kerala state government, by the mid-1960s 
local authorities (Panchayaths) had become nodal agencies of state government 
administration and they were searching for opportunities to enhance revenue. Three 
Panchayaths in the Vypin block - Pallippuram, Kuzhuppilly and Nayarambalam - 
noted the practice of rents collected from wetlands by the state government, and asked 
it to transfer to them the ownership rights over purampoke lands and water bodies that 
lay within their respective administrative limits under the state Panchayath Raj Act 
(1960: sections 62, 64, 82, 84 &149). But the state government fisheries department 
was reluctant to hand over these ownership rights to local Panchayaths because such a 
move would reduce its income from fishing rents. Many private landowners who 
owned major water channels also objected to the move: as one landowner remarked, 
“taking over Poyil administration by the Panchayath was not acceptable to us as it 
reduces our control over water channels and on the fishermen who were granted 
access on channels under our control”.   
 
The state government fisheries department filed an appeal against the provisions of 
the Act, and the hearing went on until 1967, when the case was resolved in favour of 
the Pallippuram Panchayath, and after long negotiations, the state government 
eventually accepted the proposals of all three Panchayaths. Hence the Cherai Poyil 
fishery was taken over by the Pallipuram Panchayath, which in March 1968 
conducted its first auction of fishing rights.
 
However, because fishers’ groups did not 
have sufficient financial resources to lease and manage the fishery, the Panchayath 
was forced to lease out management rights to private entrepreneurs. But local fishing 
communities objected to this private contracting, and demanded a greater role for 
registered fishers’ organizations, of which there were 19 at that time. One of the 
leaders of the Vala fishing caste remarked during an interview: “We, along with the 
Arayas, organised protest marches and hunger strikes in front of the Panchayath 
office, and even threatened to withdraw one of our representatives from the 
Panchayath council if our demands were not met.  Finally they agreed”. After 
protracted negotiations, the Panchayath decided to lease out the fisheries to the 
fishers’ organisations, albeit at a fee that was 100 rupees higher than the amount bid 
by private contractors. Nevertheless, local government, in the shape of the 
Panchayath, remained firmly in the driving seat.  
 
5. The present system of fisheries governance   
 
Section 4.3 describes the system of fisheries governance in the Cherai Poyil fishery 
which remains broadly in place today. It consists of two elements: local government 
(the Panchayath), which is the major player; and the local community, the minor 
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player, each of which serves its own interest by participating in the partnership. The 
Panchayath benefits from revenue derived by leasing the fisheries to the fishers’ 
organisations; the local community (which includes the fishers’ organisations) 
benefits from the security of settled fishing rights and from being protected from 
subordination to the higher castes, by the leasing arrangements. The Panchayath 
learned from past experience of the state government that direct top-down, day-to-day 
supervision of fisheries by government was expensive and time-consuming, and that 
the cooperation of the community was essential to ensure more effective governance. 
For its part, the communities recognized that community-based governance was not 
feasible because of lack of fishers’ skills to navigate the complexities of modern 
fisheries management.   
 
5.1 Role of the Panchayath 
 
The role of decentralised institutions in natural resources management has been 
highlighted by many scholars [16][17][18][19]20]. In the Cherai Poyil fishery, the 
topmost authority is the Panchayath which leases out the water body to the contractor 
who in turn allocates fishing rights to various gear groups, including women. This 
lease, however, is subject to a set of rules and regulations regarding the use of 
different fishing methods, type of gears, and mesh size regulation. When the 
contractor executes contract, the Panchayath hands over a written set of rules to direct 
fishing activities during the tenure, and the contractor has to follow them to the letter. 
Some of these rules are detailed restrictions relating to particular features of the 
fishery, such as the proper distance between stake nets, and the prohibition on 
trammel fishing after the monsoon season. Other rules are more general, such as 
arrangements to be made for inspection of canals by officials of the state government 
fisheries department, and directions to the contractor for organizing his/her activities 
without obstructing the activities of other stakeholders. Under the previous 
community-based management regime, most decision-making rights were vested with 
local cast communities, but under the new regime, subject to the above rules, such 
decisions are typically made by the contractor, largely without consulting local 
communities. 
 
Nevertheless, in the rules governing access to the fishery, and the rates of fees 
charged to fishers for using different types of gear, three principles of good 
governance can be observed – equity; customary rights; and environmental 
stewardship. The principle of equity is seen in the fact that fee rates are not set 
arbitrarily by the contractor alone, but in the presence of nominees from the 
Panchayath and in consultation with the different gear groups who seek access to the 
fishery.Moreover, the rates are proportional to the catch rates of respective gears. The 
principle of customary rights is seen in the fact that since cast net fishers retain 
customary rights on the Poyil, they are allowed to fish early in the morning, and are 
charged only a nominal fee by the contractor as a token of acknowledging their 
traditional rights. The principle of environmental stewardship is seen in the fact that 
women are allowed to extract the clam beds located along the western part of the 
Poyil and no fee is charged, because removing clams improves the quality of habitat 
and increase fishing activities in the Poyil.   
 
However, although these principles are sensitive to the requirements of local 
communities (gear groups) and women, the contractor often violates them, thereby 
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causing conflicts to occur. For example, despite local resistance, the contractor 
granted fishing permits to a new generation of gill nets (disco net/vaisali net/Adakkam 
Kolly vala) into the Poyil. By charging high rents (40% of the total catch), the 
contractor yielded to such pressures, despite negating the legitimate rights of other 
traditional fishermen. Similarly, under the influence of local Panchayath, the 
contractor granted access to a group of local marine fishermen into the Poyil. Fishing 
activities of these entrants led to the reduction of catches of cast net fishermen. 
Finally the contractor did not support the community’s struggles against the 
aquaculture lobby which polluted the water body, because a confrontation with that 
lobby could have weakened his power base. 
 
On the issue of enforcement of the rules, we should distinguish between the contractor 
enforcing rules on fishers, and the Panchayath enforcing rules on the contractor. The 
contractor is assiduous in enforcing rules on fishers to whom he allocates fishing 
rights, employing 12 workers as enforcers.  These enforcers issue passes to other 
fishermen, collect fees and fines, and guard the fishery by checking for illicit or 
banned fishing gears and trespassing. If violations are detected, they seize crafts and 
gears of trespassers and release them only after collecting the appropriate fines. Since 
the monitoring team is vigilant, few fishers violate the rules.  Monitoring cast net 
fishers has never been a major problem for the enforcement team as they are all local 
people who fish in the morning and are well-known personally to the enforcers. In the 
case of outsiders, monitoring is more difficult, because they fish during the night and 
leave before the enforcement team arrives to fix the stake nets. However, surprise 
checks are often made, and unauthorised fishing is detected. During the survey year 
(2004) the fines collected by the contractor amounted to Rs. 38,000, as reported by 
one of the members of the enforcement team. 
 
By contrast, the Panchayath’s enforcement of rules on the contractor is low-keyed. As 
the owner of the Cherai Poyil fisheries, the Panchayath has a duty to ensure that the 
gear groups and the leaseholder comply with legal codes and regulations passed by 
both the central and state governments. But the Panchayath has been criticised by 
central government agencies for transferring that responsibility to the contractor rather 
than enforcing them itself, because of high transaction costs. The fact is that the 
Panchayath has adopted an informal approach, preferring a policy of political 
lobbying, community participation, and negotiation to a heavy-handed coercion. For 
instance, there are contentious issues between the Panchayath and the costal 
regulation zone (CRZ) management authority regarding the implementation of CRZ 
rules within village limits. Instead of implementing these rules comprehensively, the 
Panchayath has been negotiating exceptions for the benefit of local communities. This 
indicates that the Panchayath prefers the role of consensus-building to the role of 
confrontation. We can see this preference in its self-appointed role of honest broker, 
when it intervenes to resolve conflicts between communities and contractors and/or 
other government departments. It has constituted a committee for this purpose which 
examines conflicts in detail and suggests alternative solutions to avoid the matter 
being referred to the legal system for resolution. This negotiated style of governance 
works well to resolve resource conflicts between the contractor and the fishing 
communities, but there are limitations on its use in other situations, such as when the 
contractor is the violator of the rules. 
  
5.2 Role of the community 
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Although the community is the junior party in the co-management partnership, its role 
is very important in giving general support to the Panchayath’s efforts to bring social 
order, justice and efficiency into the system. Also, local communities play a 
significant environmental role by working to maintain the ecological stability and 
healthy quality of the water body, which is crucial for the sustainability of the 
fisheries on which they all rely. There have been many instances where communities 
resisted the economic activities of modern entrants who over-used resources and 
polluted the water body (although the communities’ capacity to resist such efforts has 
been eroded considerably in recent years). For instance, fishing communities defeated 
a proposal put forward by the Panchayath and the Fisheries Department to convert the 
Poyil into a fish sanctuary, because they feared that the project was an attempt to 
commercialize the local water body for the tourism lobby which would have reduced 
the productivity of the Poyil and ruined many fishers’ livelihoods. Another example 
was the action of fishers to stop the practice of extracting juvenile and fry prawns 
(Penaeus indicus (white prawn) and Penaeus monodon (Tiger prawn)) from the Poyil 
to sell to private aquaculture farmers. Fishers noted that such extractions sharply 
reduced the overall productivity of Poyil fisheries and their own catches: ror instance, 
a cast net fishermen remarked that “We do not get enough prawns nowadays due to 
the incoming of the aquaculture farm near the bar mouth and also due to unauthorised 
fry collection from the Poyil…We have to ban these”. As the matter involved local 
communities, the issue was referred to the local Panchayath, and as a result of its 
involvement, the practice of juvenile prawn fishing was banned in the Poyil.  
 
6. Appraisal of co-management in Cochin Poyil fishery 
 
The current system of co-management in the Cochia Poyil fishery has both strengths 
and weaknesses.   
 
6.1 Strengths 
 
Of the four main strengths of the co-management system, the most important is the 
economic security it has brought fishers and their families. There was a general 
feeling among interviewees that the living standards of the Cochin Poyil fishermen 
have improved under the co-management regime, and are better than for the other 
fishing communities in the estuary. Table 1 shows the distribution of fishing effort, 
employment and earnings of communities fishing in Cherai Poyil, compared to those 
who fish in the nearby stations outside the Poyil.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
The table clearly demonstrates that communities fishing in Cherai poyil have an 
economic advantage over communities fishing in the nearby stations in the Cochin 
estuary.  They exert a lower fishing effort than the other communities; their number of 
fishing days is greater; and their daily earnings are much higher.  
 
Second, co-management has brought an effective means of conflict resolution to the 
fishery. Indeed, a basic advantage of the decentralised co-management arrangement 
practised in Cherai Poyil lies in the ability of the system to resolve conflicts at the 
lowest level possible, incorporating only those parties directly involved in the dispute 
 9 
[22][23]. This subsidiarity principle followed in the region is the product of tacit 
cooperation between local communities, the Panchayath, and the contractor.  It has 
two elements, preventive and resolutive. The preventive element is the attempt to 
anticipate sources of tension before they arise. Since conflicts can occur when 
communities are not consulted well in advance regarding implementation of crucial 
changes on modes of management, the co-management system is careful to carry out 
such prior consultations. Furthermore, conflicts between various gear groups are 
minimised in the Poyil by regulating access, partitioning territories, and reserving 
specific timings for competing gear groups. For instance, cast net operations are 
conducted in the morning, while gill nets have to organize fishing between sunset and 
sunrise. The resolutive element lies in the procedures devised for solving the conflicts 
that do arise, including conflicts over the use and overuse of resources; conflicts 
between various gear groups; conflicts between fishers/aquaculturalists and the  
tourism industry; and trans-boundary conflicts over sharing water. To deal with such 
problems, the Panchayath has constituted a conflict resolution committee consisting 
of the president, the secretary, three standing committee members from the finance, 
development and service departments, and two opposition party members. In case of 
serious differences of opinion over decision-making, the issues are referred to the 
main political parties/community organizations of the region for resolution, and these 
rulings are generally obeyed by all concerned. If the issues still remain unresolved, 
the parties can approach the courts, though none of the grievances have so far gone to 
the formal courts for resolution, since the parties know well that such steps are very 
time-consuming.  
     
Third, co-management has improved the enforcement of regulations in the Cochin 
Poyil fishery. The enforcement team of the Panchayath undertakes routine patrolling, 
and seizes crafts and gears if entry passes are not held or catches are under-reported. 
Since fishers have to pay high fines to get back these confiscated assets, very few 
violate these rules. The fine for not having an entry pass can be up to Rs. 2000, and 
recovery of gear such as gill nets can cost Rs. 500, a fine that exceeds the cost of 
buying a new net.    
 
Fourth, co-management has formally endorsed the fishing rights of women. Women’s 
rights to estuarine resources have been legally recognized by granting them access to 
prawn filtration farms as soon as the paddy rice is harvested, a process known locally 
as kalakkippidutham. Hand-picking (Thappipidutham) is another form of enforcing 
women’s rights in fishing grounds and provides them with decent livelihoods. Access 
to the fishing grounds is regulated by a fee of Rs. 3 per day, and women earn around 
Rs. 50 per day for 150 days pa from this activity.  
   
6.2 Weaknesses 
 
Despite the above strengths, there are three main weaknesses in the co-management 
system in the Cochin Poyil fishery. First, violations of the regulations by the 
contractor are not rigorously addressed by the Panchayath. Indeed, strict enforcement 
is really only on paper, because in practice, the Panchayath sees the contractor as a 
major source of revenue, and therefore yields to whatever he/she dictates in the Poyil 
administration, provided that his/her decisions do not generate serious conflicts in the 
Panchayath.  There are even allegations that members of the governing bodies of the 
political parties are financially compensated by the contractor to persuade them not to 
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impose exacting strict penalties on the contractor. Moreover, there is little guarantee 
that the Panchayath will fulfil its own obligations. For instance, although the 
Panchayath is responsible for the deepening of canals to maintain the health of the 
lagoon, it has seldom spent money to carry out this duty. This failure has led to the 
degradation of the environmental quality of the Poyil, and local communities have 
had to ask the state government to invest money to reverse this deterioration. 
 
Second, the system has not sufficiently contained the volume of new entrants into the 
fishery. Since access to the Cherai Poyil fishery is now subject to formal regulation, 
the communities could overcome the tragedy of commons, but there was considerable 
pressure to allow access to fishers from other communities, and as the system of 
governance had shifted from community-based co-management to contractor led co-
management, the community’s wish to deny entry to outsiders did not prevail. In 
1995, a few coastal fishermen approached the local Panchayath through their 
councillor seeking fishing rights in the Cherai Poyil fishery. Cast net operators 
strongly objected to this move, arguing that granting access to outsiders would reduce 
catches in cast nets and increase their economic vulnerability. They also pointed out 
that the type of net for which permission was being sought was highly destructive, 
and the use of these nets especially during night fishing would damage the natural 
resources of the fishery as well as reduce the inflow of prawns and other high-value 
fin fishes.  However, these arguments were rejected by the local Panchayath, because 
coastal fishers constituted a solid vote bank and the political costs of dismissing their 
demand for access to fishing in the water body were very high. The Panchayath 
granted access to coastal fishermen to operate their gill net (pattum vala) for three 
months: cast net fishers could fish during the day while gill netters could fish during 
the night. In addition, as we noted in section 5.1, despite resistance from local fishing 
communities, the contractor also granted permits to marine fishers to operate the disco 
net/vaisali net/Adakkam Kolly vala in the Cherai Poyil fishery, because these 
operators paid a high entry fee.  
  
The third weakness of co-management in this fishery is that it has allowed the 
principle of private property in aquaculture to over-develop shrimp production at the 
expense of the quality of the water body. Despite the resistance mounted by local 
communities to the extension of private property to aquaculture farms, and the 
consequent misuse of the water body by a few landlords to increase their short-term 
profits, aquaculture farms have lowered the quality of the ecological services and tidal 
functions to local communities, especially around the tail end of the Poyil. For 
instance, fishers vainly complained that the development of farms and consequent 
construction of bunds has reduced the flow of water from the bar-mouth, thereby 
diminishing the availability of shrimp seeds and juvenile fishes into the Poyil and 
increasing the accumulation of mud and sediments which has further reduced the 
capacity of the Poyil to hold water. Moreover, local aquaculture farms have continued 
to pollute the water body by constantly flushing sediments and pollutants into it. 
During harvests they even use poison to collect all the prawns, and the water released 
from these farms adds a toxic ingredient to the water body. Despite repeated requests, 
no progress has been achieved in regulating such environmental pollution. This 
situation is symptomatic of the fact that co-management has failed to regulate 
externalities in general: the Panchayath has not succeeded in preventing destructive 
activities of other users, the costs of which have escalated in recent years. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
The Cherai Poyil system of co-management is one in which local government has 
accepted the role of the local community as a junior partner in resource management 
and provided space for its activities and initiatives in the management of lagoon 
fisheries in Kerala. To some extent, it conforms to the hypothesis of Pomeroy & 
Viswanathan and others of a shift from a community-based system to a broader 
community-based co-management system, reinforced by devolved powers from the 
central government, with a wider remit embracing socio-economic goals as well as 
natural resource management. It has grounded fishers’ rights – including women’s 
rights - in a stable framework which provides sustainable livelihoods for families 
reliant on fisheries. It has also formalised an institutional structure for resolving 
conflicts between groups in the community and for increasing the effectiveness of 
enforcement of the regulations. However, its relaxed style of governance, relying 
more on negotiation than on confrontation, and its susceptibility to political pressures, 
has meant that it has not dealt effectively with the triple problems of the corrupting 
influence of money; the tragedy of the commons; and the externalities of water 
pollution. If the balance of power in the co-governance system between the local 
government and the local community were to shift towards a more equal share for the 
community, these problems might be more resolutely addressed. 
 
References 
 
[1] Pomeroy RS, Viswanathan KK. Experiences with fisheries co-management in 
Southeast Asia and Bangladesh. In Wilson DC, Nielsen JR, Degnbol P, editors. The 
fisheries co-management experience. Dordrecht: Kluwer; 2003: 101. 
 
[2] Allison EH, Badjeck MC. Fisheries co-management in inland waters: a review of 
international experience. Sustainable Fisheries Livelihoods Programme (SFLP) 
(GCP/INT/735/UK): FAO/DFID Report; 2004. 
 
[3] Berkes F, editor. Common property resources: ecology and community-based 
sustainable development. London: Belhaven; 1989. 
[4] Berkes F. Rethinking community-based conservation. Conservation Biology 2004; 
18: 621-630. 
[5] Berkes F, Mahon R, McConney P, Pollnac RC, Pomeroy RS. Managing small-
scale fisheries: alternative directions and methods. Ottawa: International Development 
Research Centre; 2001. 
 
[6] Pomeroy, Viswanathan 2003: 101. 
 
[7] Pomeroy, Viswanathan 2003: 101. 
 
[8] Pomeroy, Viswanathan 2003: 101. 
 
[9] Pomeroy, Viswanathan 2003: 101. 
 
[10] Allison, Badjeck 2004. 
 12 
 
[11] Thomson KT, Berkes F. Public and private sector cooperation in the management 
of estuaries of South India. Technical report submitted to Shastri Indo-Canadian 
Institute. Delhi: CUSAT; 2006. 
 
[12] Thomson KT. The role of public-private cooperation in the management of 
estuarine fisheries: learning from the Kerala model of co-management. Paper 
presented at Survival of the Commons: Mounting Challenges and New Realities, the 
Eleventh Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common 
Property. Bali, Indonesia, June 19-23, 2006. 
http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/00002078; 2006. 
 
[13] Scoones I. Sustainable rural livelihoods: a framework for analysis. IDS Working 
Paper 72. Brighton: Institute for Development Studies, Sussex University; 1998. 
 
[14] Lobe K, Berkes F. ‘The padu system of community-based fisheries management: 
change and local institutional innovation in south India’ Marine Policy 2004; 28 (3): 
271-281. 
 
[15] Srinivasan JT. ‘State regulation versus co-management: evidence from the 
Cochin Estuarine fisheries in India’ Environment and Development Economics 2005; 
10: 97–117. 
 
[16] Ribot JC. Democratic decentralisation of natural resources: institutionalizing 
popular participation. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute; 2002. 
 
[17] Ribot JC. Waiting for democracy: the politics of choice in natural resource 
decentralization. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute; 2004. 
 
[18] Ribot J. Institutional choice and recognition: effects on the formation and 
consolidation of local democracy. Natural Resource and Democracy Research 
Concept Paper. Washington DC: World Resources Institute; 2005. 
 
[19] Crook RC, Manor J. Democracy and decentralisation in South Asia and West 
Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1998. 
 
[20] Crook RC, Sverrisson AS. Decentralisation and poverty-alleviation in developing 
countries: a comparative analysis or, is West Bengal unique? IDS Working Paper 130. 
Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, Sussex University; 2001. 
 
[21] Thomson KT. Socio Economic Management of Biodiversity in Indian Estuaries. 
Report of project funded by the World Bank/ Ministry of Environment and Forests, 
Delhi; 2003. 
www.coe.mse.ac.in/eercrep/fullrep/mes/MES_FR_KTThomson.pdf 
 
[22] Bothe M. The subsidiarity principles: origin and content. In Dommen E, editor. 
Fair principles of sustainable development. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing on 
behalf of the UN. 
 13 
[23] McCay B, Jentoft S. From the bottom up: participatory issues in fisheries 
management. Society and Natural Resources 1996; 9: 237–250. 
 
 
 
 
 
